Stefan Voigt
List of Publications
Monographs
Constitutional Economics – A Primer. Cambridge University Press 2020.
Institutionenökonomik („Institutional Economics“) Neue Ökonomische Bibliothek, UTB: Fink Verlag, München, 2002 (2nd edition 2009; translations into Czech 2008 [“Institucionální ekonomie”], Chinese [2016], and Arabic [2017); into English [2019 with Cambridge University Press]).
(together with André Schmidt) Making European Merger Policy More Predictable, Heidelberg et al.: Springer, 2005.
(together with Thoralf Erb, Jochen Jahraus, Uwe Mummert and Axel Schulz). Konsequenzen der Globalisierung für die Wettbewerbspolitik (“Consequences of Globalization for Antitrust Policy”), Frankfurt et al., Peter Lang, 2000.
Explaining Constitutional Change – A Positive Economics Approach, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1999.
Die Welthandelsordnung zwischen Konflikt und Stabilität – Konfliktpotentiale und Konfliktlösungsmechanismen (“The World Trade Order Between Conflict and Stability – Conflict Potential and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms”), Freiburg: Haufe, 1992.
Editor of edited volumes
(together with Roger Congleton and Bernie Grofman) The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice (two volumes). Oxford University Press 2019.
(together with Thomas Eger and Stefan Oeter) International Law and the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions to the XIVth Travemünde Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Law. Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 2017.
(together with Thomas Eger and Stefan Oeter) Economic Analysis of International Law. Contributions to the XIIIth Travemünde Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Law. Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 2014.
Design of Constitutions, Cheltenham et al.: Edward Elgar, 2013.
(together with Eli Salzberger) “The Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings”; Special symposium issue of Constitutional Political Economy (Vol. 20, 3-4, 2009).
(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen) Scientific Competition, Conferences on New Political Economy, Vol. 25, 2008.
(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen); The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law, Conferences on New Political Economy, Vol. 24, 2007.
(together with Max Albert and Dieter Schmidtchen) International Conflict Resolution, Conferences on New Political Economy, Vol. 23, 2005.
Constitutional Political Economy, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003.
(together with H.-J. Wagener) Constitutions, Markets and Law – Recent Experiences in Transition Economies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002.
(together with Manfred E. Streit) Europa reformieren – Vorschläge von Ökonomen und Juristen zur zukünftigen Verfaßtheit Europas (“Reforming Europe – Proposals from Economists and Lawyers concerning the Future Constitution of Europe”), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996.
Papers in Journals
(122) (with Christian Bjørnskov). This Time is Different? – On the Use of Emergency Measures During the Corona Pandemic. Forthcoming in European Journal of Law & Economics (2021).
(121) (with Christian Bjørnskov). Emergencies: On the misuse of governmental powers. Forthcoming in Public Choice (2021).
(120) Contracting for Catastrophe:Legitimizing Emergency Constitutions by Drawing on Social Contract Theory. Forthcoming in Res Publica (2021).
Portuguese version as: Contrato para a catástrofe: legitimaçãao das constituições de emergência com base na teoria do contrato social. Revista de Direito Publico da Economia 75: 249 – 278 (2021).
(119) (with Nora El-Bialy, Elisa Fraile Aranda, Andreas Nicklisch, and Lamis Saleh). A Sense of No Future in an Uncertain Present: Altruism and Risk-Seeking among Syrian Refugees in Jordan. Forthcoming in Journal of Refugee Studies (2021).
(118) Prosecutors: A Cross-National Perspective, in: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2021).
(117) (with Jerg Gutmann and Mahdi Khesali) “Constitutional Comprehensibility and the Coordination of Citizens: A test of the Weingast-hypothesis.” University of Chicago Law Review (2021).
(116) (with Christian Bjørnskov) “Terrorism and emergency constitutions in the Muslim world.” Forthcoming in: Journal of Peace Research (2021).
(115) (with Jerg Gutmann) Testing Todd: Family Types and Political Development. Journal of Institutional Economics (2021).
(114) (with Jerg Gutmann) Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely? Public Choice, 1-28 (2021).
(113) Mind the Gap: Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality; Forthcoming in: International Journal of Constitutional Law (2021).
(112) (with Jerg Gutmann and Lars Feld) Plus de croissance économique grâce à une justice indépendante: Les résultats d’une étude transnationale, Journal des Libertés, 10 (October 2020).
(111) (with Jerg Gutmann and Fabio Padovano) Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata, European Journal of Political Economy 65:101925 (2020).
(110) (with Jerg Gutmann) “Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle.” European Journal of Law & Economics 49:83-100 (2020).
(109) (with Jerg Gutmann) Traditional Law in times of the nation state: why is it so prevalent? Journal of Institutional Economics (2020)
(108) Mehr Mut in der Rentenpolitik! Ein Vorschlag Wirtschaftsdienst 4:294-299 (2020)
(107) (with C. Bjørnskov) Is constitutionalized media freedom only window dressing? Evidence from terrorist attacks, Public Choice 187:321–348 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00783.
(106) Rechtsstsaatlichkeit in der Europäischen Union – ein Vorschlag für ein besseres Verfahren, List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 45(2): 213-223.
(105) (with M. Hassan, S. Mansour, and M. Gadallah) When Syria was in Egypt’s Land: Egyptians cooperate with Syrians, but less with each other. Public Choice (2019).
(104) (with Bernd Hayo) “The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence.” Economics Letters 183:108603 (2019).
(103) (with C. Bjørnskov) “When Does Terror induce a State of Emergency? And what are the Effects?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(4): 579-613 (2020)
(102) (with Anke Gerber and Andreas Nicklisch) “The Role of Ignorance in the Emergence of Redistribution”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 163, 239-261 (2019).
(101) (with Jerg Gutmann) “The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability.” Supreme Court Economic Review 27(1):1-19 (2019).
(100) (with Jerg Gutmann) “The Rule of Law: Measurement and deep roots.” European Journal of Poliltical Economy. 54:68-82 (2018).
(99) (with C. BjØrnskov) “The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions.” International Journal of Constitutional Law. 16(1):101-127 (2018).
(98) (with C. BjØrnskov) “Why do governments call a state of emergency? On the determinants of using emergency constitutions.” European Journal of Political Economy. 54:110-123 (2018).
(97) “The independence of international courts – making reputation work?” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law. 24(4):511-530 (2017).
(96) “How to Measure Informal Institutions.” Journal of Institutional Economics. 14(1):1-22 (2018).
(95) (with C. BjØrnskov) “Dealing with Disaster: Analyzing the Emergency Constitutions of the U.S. States.” Arizona State Law Journal. 49(3):883-906 (2017).
(94) (with Alexander Wulf) “What makes prosecutors independent? Analysing the institutional determinants of prosecutorial independence.” Journal of Institutional Economics. 15(1): 99-120 (2019).
(93) “Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?” Constitutional Political Economy. 28:1-13 (2017).
(92) (with Jerg Gutmann and Katharina Pfaff) “Banking Crises and Human Rights.” Applied Economics Letters. 24:1374-1377 (2017).
(91) (with Jerg Gutmann and Sina Imhof) “Are You Green Yet? On the Diffusion of Constitutionally Protected Environmental Rights.” Asian Journal of Law and Economics. 7(3): 305-322 (2016).
(90) “Determinants of Judical Efficiency: A Survey.” European Journal of Law and Economics. 42(2):183-208 (2016).
(89) (with Bernd Hayo) “Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence.” International Review of Law and Economics. 48:1-13 (2016).
(88) (with M. Gassebner and J. Gutmann) “When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants.” Public Choice. 169(3-4):293-313 (2016).
(87) (with Nora El-Bialy) “Identifying the determinants of aggregate judicial performance: taxpayers’ money well spent?” European Journal of Law and Economics. 41(2):283-319 (2016).
(86) (with Lorenz Blume) “Does Direct Democracy Make for Better Citizens? A Cautionary Warning Based on Cross-Country Evidence.” Constitutional Political Economy. 26(4):391-420 (2015).
(85) (with Lars Feld and Jerg Gutmann) “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators.” European Journal of Political Economy. 38:197-211 (2015).
(84) (with Lars Feld and Jerg Gutmann) “Mehr Wirtschaftswachstum durch eine unabhängige Justiz?” Justice – Justiz – Giustizia. 2015/3 (2015).
(83) (with Jerg Gutmann) “The rule of law and constitutionalism in Muslim countries.” Public Choice. 162(3-4):351-380 (2015).
(82) (with Axel Dreher and Heiner Mikosch) “Membership Has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI.” World Development. 66:346-358 (2015).
(81) (with Lars Hornuf) “Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is.” European Journal of Law & Economics. 39(2):287-311 (2015).
(80) (with Jerg Gutmann) “On the Wrong Side of the Law – Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary.” International Review of Law and Economics. 43:156-166 (2015).
(79) “The Economic Analysis of Direct Democracy.” Hamburg Law Review. 2:49-56 (2015).
(78) (with Christian Björnskov) “Constitutional Verbosity and Trust.” Public Choice. 161:91-112 (2014).
(77) (with Bernd Hayo) “Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence: A Global Survey”. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 11(1):159-195 (2014).
(76) (with Bernd Hayo) “The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth.” CESifo Economic Studies. 60(3):490-524 (2014).
(75) (with Sang Min Park) “Not a Quick Fix: Arbitration is No Substitute for State Courts.” The Journal of Development Studies. 49(11):1514-1531 (2013).
(74) (with Jerg Gutmann) “Turning Cheap Talk into Economic Growth: On the Relationship between Property Rights and Judicial Independence.” Journal of Comparative Economics. 41:66-73 (2013).
(73) (with Lorenz Blume) “The Economic Effects of Constitutional Budget Institutions.” European Journal of Political Economy. 29:235-251 (2013).
(72) “How (Not) to Measure Institutions.” Journal of Institutional Economics. 9(1):1-26 (2013).
(71) (with Bernd Hayo) “Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 88:47-61 (2013).
(70) (with Lorenz Blume) “The Effects of Direct Democracy on Political Participation.” Economics of Governance. 13:287-310 (2012).
(69) “How to Measure the Rule of Law.” Kyklos. 65(2):262-284 (2012).
(68) “On the optimal number of courts”. International Review of Law and Economics. 32(1):49-62 (2012).
(67) (together with Anne van Aaken) “Do Individual Disclosure Rules for Parliamentarians Improve Government Effectiveness?” Economics of Governance. 12(4):301-324 (2011).
(66) (together with Lorenz Blume and Thomas Döring) “Fiscal Effects of Reforming Local Constitutions: Recent German Experiences.” Urban Studies. 48(10):2123-2140 (August 2011).
(65) “Empirical Constitutional Economics: Onward and Upward?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 80(2):319-330 (2011).
(64) (together with Axel Dreher) “Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers.” Journal of Comparative Economics. 39:326-348 (2011).
(63) (together with Lorenz Blume) “Federalism and decentralization – a critical survey of frequently used indicators.” Constitutional Political Economy. 22(3):238-264 (2011).
(62) (together with Lorenz Blume) “The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization: A cross-country assessment.” Public Choice. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9745-z (2011).
(61) (together with Bernd Hayo) “Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?”. Journal of Comparative Economics. 38(3):283-305 (2010).
(60) (together with Lorenz Blume) “Does Organizational Design of Supreme Audit Institutions Matter? A Cross Country Assessment.“ European Journal of Political Economy. 27(2):215-229 (2011).
(59) “Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments.” Public Choice. 146(1-2):205-256 (2011).
(58) (together with Anne van Aaken and Lars Feld) “Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? – An Empirical Evaluation Across 78 Countries.”, American Law and Economics Review. 12:204-244 (2010).
(57) “The Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross Country Analysis”. European Journal of Political Economy. 25(3):327-339 (2009).
(56) (together with Lorenz Blume and Jens Müller) “The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment.” Public Choice. 140:431-61 (2009).
(55) (together with Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Carten Wolf) “The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini.” Public Choice. 139:197-225 (2009).
(54) “Explaining Constitutional Garrulity.” International Review of Law and Economics. 29:290-303 (2009).
(53) (together with Lorenz Blume and Thomas Döring) “Fiskalische Effekte der Kommunalverfassungsreformen der 1990er Jahre in Deutschland.” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik. 228(4):317-344 (2008).
(52) “The Effects of Competition Policy on Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators.” Journal of Development Studies. 45(8):1225-1248 (2009).
(51) (together with Anne van Aaken) “Verhaltenspflichten für Parlamentarier und ihre Folgen.” (“Individual Disclosure Rules for Parliamentarians and their Consequences.” Mitteilungen des Instituts für Deutsches und Europäisches Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung (MIP). Vol. 13 (2007), available at: http://www.pruf.de. A revised version as “Der „gläserne“ Abgeordnete? Transparenzregeln für Parlamentarier und ihre Folgen.” Journal für Rechtspolitik. 16(3):169-176 (2008).
(50) (together with Bernd Hayo) “Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 164(4), 751-777 (2008).
(49) “The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability – Cross-Country Evidence.” European Journal of Law and Economics. 25(2):95-123 (2008).
(48) “Are International Merchants Stupid? – A Natural Experiment Refutes the Legal Origin Theory.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 5(1):1-20 (2008).
(47) (together with Lorenz Blume) “The Economic Effects of Human Rights.” Kyklos. 60(4):509-38 (2007).
(46) (together with Bernd Hayo) “Explaining de facto judicial independence.” International Review of Law and Economics. 27(3):269-90 (2007).
(45) (together with Lorenz Blume) “Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält.” (“When Justitia asks for a little extra-money.”) Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. 8(1):65-92 (2007).
(44) (together with Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume) “Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence – the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.” Journal of Development Economics. 82:348-73 (2007).
(43) (together with Thomas Döring) “Reforming Federalism German Style – More than a Minor Face Lift?” Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy. 41(4):201-8 (2006).
(42) “Robust Political Economy: The Case of Antitrust.” Review of Austrian Economics. 19(2/3):203-15 (June 2006).
(41) (together with André Schmidt) „Der „more economic approach“ in der Missbrauchsaufsicht: Einige kritische Anmerkungen zu den Vorschlägen der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb.“ (“The more economic approach in Antitrust: Some Critical Remarks on the Commission’s Proposals.”) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (2006).
(40) (together with André Schmidt) „Die prozeduralen Aspekte der Fusionskontrolle – die vergessene Seite der Reform.“ (“The Procedural Aspects of European Merger Control – the Forgotten Side of the Reform.“) Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften. 56(2):164-84.
(39) “Crisis – What Crisis? After the Failure of the Draft Constitution, Europe Needs Thorough Discusssions – and a New Focus on Integration.” Intereconomics. 40(4):196-200 (2005).
(38) (together with Roland Kirstein) “The Violent and the Weak – When Dictators Care About Social Contracts.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 65(4): 863-90 (2006).
(37) “Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society.” The Independent Review. 10(1):59-82 (2005).
(36) (together with André Schmidt) “Switching to Substantial Impediments of Competition (SIC) can have Substantial Costs – SIC!” European Competition Law Review. 25(9):584-89 (2004).
(35) (together with André Schmidt) “The Commission’s Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers: Improvement or Deterioration?” Common Market Law Review. 41(6):1583-94 (2004).
(34) “The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice – Towards A Comparative Analysis.” Rechtstheorie. (2005).
(33) (together with Anne van Aaken and Eli Salzberger) “The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework.” Constitutional Political Economy. 15:261-80 (2004).
(32) “Iudex Calculat: The ECJ’s Quest for Power.” Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie. 22:77-101 (2003).
(31) “Towards Ever More Confusion? The Convention’s Proposal for a European Constitution.” Intereconomics. 38(4):185-8 (2003).
(30) (together with André Schmidt) “ Mehr Rechtssicherheit in der Europäischen Fusionskontrolle?“ (“Improved Predictability in European Merger Control?“) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb. 9:897-906 (2003).
(29) (together with Lars Feld) “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators.” European Journal of Political Economy. 19(3):497-527 (2003).
(28) “Die unabhängige Justiz – eine vernachlässigte Determinante zur Erklärung der Zentralbankunabhängigkeit?” (“The Independent Judiciary – A Neglected Variable for Explaining Central Bank Independence?”) Schmollers Jahrbuch. 122(2):207-25 (2002).
(27) (together with Eli Salzberger) “Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers.” Kyklos. 55(2):247-68 (2002).
(26) (together with Eli Salzberger) “On the Delegation of Powers – with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe and Israel.” Theoretical Inquiries into Law. 3(1): 207-63 (2002).
(25) (together with Eli Salzberger) “On the Delegation of Powers – with Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe.” Constitutional Political Economy. 13(1):25-52 (2002).
An abridged German version in: Nutzinger, H.G. (Hrsg.). “Verteilungsprobleme im Transformationsprozeß. ” Duncker & Humblot. 9-42 (2001).
(24) (with Gert G. Wagner) “Zur Reform der Altersvorsorge – ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag.” (“Reforming Old Age Pension Systems – A Proposal Based On Constitutional Economics.”) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik. 49:235-49 (2000).
(23) “Fusionen und Globalisierung – Einige Notizen zur Genese von Wettbewerbsregeln.” (“Mergers and Globalisation – Some Notes on Generating Competition Rules.”) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik. 49(2):158-68 (2000).
(22) “Freiwilligkeit durch Zwangsandrohung – eine institutionenökonomische Analyse von Selbstverpflichtungserklärungen in der Umweltpolitik.” (“Voluntariness by threatening compulsion – using institutional economics to analyze voluntary pollution constraints in environmental policy.” Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht. 3:393-408 (2000).
(21) “Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions.” Constitutional Political Economy. 10(3):283-300 (1999).
(20) “Implicit Constitutional Change – Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document.” European Journal of Law and Economics. 7: 197-224 (1999).
(19) “Making Constitutions Work – Conditions for Maintaining the Rule of Law.” Cato Journal. 8(2):191-208 (1998).
(18) “Methodische Konzepte zur Reform sozialer Sicherungssysteme – einige Überlegungen aus konstitutionenökonomischer Sicht.” (“Reforming Social Security Systems – Some Considerations from Constitutional Economics.”) Zeitschrift für internationales und ausländisches Sozialrecht. 12:53-66 (1998).
(17) (together with Daniel Kiwit) “Grenzen des institutionellen Wettbewerbs.” (“Limits to Institutional Competition.”) Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie. 17:313-37 (1998).
(16) (together with M.E. Streit) “Toward Ever Closer Union – Or Ever Larger? Or Both? Entry to the European Union from the Perspective of Constitutional Economics.” an abridged version in International Review of Law and Economics. 16:385-8 (1996).
Complete version in Dieter Schmidtchen und Robert Cooter (Eds.) Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union, Cheltenham, Elgar. 223-47 (1997).
(15) “Positive Constitutional Economics – A Survey.” Public Choice. 90:11-53.
Reprinted in: Charles K. Rowley (Ed.): Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer. 11-53 (1997).
(14) “Pure Eclecticism – The Tool Kit of the Constitutional Economist.” Constitutional Political Economy. 7:177-96 (1996).
(13) “Kompensationgeschäfte – zurück zum Naturaltausch?” (“Countertrade – Back to Primitive Barter?”) wisu. 25:34-36 (1996).
(12) (together with Daniel Kiwit:) “Überlegungen zum institutionellen Wandel unter Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses interner und externer Institutionen.” (“Considerations on Institutional Change taking into account the Relationship between External and Internal Institutions”) ORDO. 46:117-48 (1995).
(11) “Die kontraktorientierte Theorie der Verfassung – Anmerkungen zum Ansatz Buchanans.” (“Social Contract Based Constitutional Economics – Some Remarks on Buchanan.”) Homo Oeconomicus. XI:173-209 (1994).
(10) “European Political Union – An Appropriate Example for Applying Constitutional Economics to Real-Life Problems? – A Note on an Article by James M. Buchanan.” ORDO. 45:273-86 (1994).
(9) “Values, Norms, Institutions, and the Prospects for Economic Growth in Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines. 4:495-529 (1993).
reprinted in Czech as: “Hodnoty a perspectivy hospodárského rustu ve strední a východní Evrope.” Politická Ekonomie. 94:733-746 (1994).
also appeared in: E. Jahn und R. Wildenmann (Eds.): “Stability in East Central Europe?” Baden-Baden: Nomos. 175-207 (1995).
(8) “Strategische Allianzen – Modisches Schlagwort oder Antwort auf globale Herausforderungen?” (“Strategic Alliances – Fashionable Catch-Phrase or Answer to Global Challenges?”) WiSt. 22:246-249 (1993).
(7) “Die Non Dilemma-These.” (“The Non-Dilemma Hypothesis.”) WiSt. 21:516- 519 (1992).
(6) “Das Lizenzauktionsverfahren: Ein zielkonformes Instrument zur Regulierung lokaler Kabelfernsehstationen? – Eine Analyse der anglo-amerikanischen Diskussion und Praxis.” (“Bidding for Franchise Monopoly – An Analysis of the Discussion and Policies Concerning the Regulation of Local Cable Television Stations in England and the U.S.”) communications – The European Journal of Communication. 17:67-90 (1992).
(5) “GATT – Institution der Welthandelsordnung.” (“GATT – Institution of the World Order.”) WiSt. 21:32-34 (1992).
(4) (together with M.E. Streit:) “Die Handelspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft aus weltwirtschaftlicher Perspektive.” (“The Trade Policy of the European Community from a Global Perspective.”) Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftspolitik. 36:193-219 (1991).
Also in: R. Wildenmann (Ed.); Staatswerdung Europas? – Optionen für eine Europäische Union. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 167-98 (1991).
Reprinted in: Manfred E. Streit: Freiburger Beiträge zur Ordnungsökonomik. Mohr (Siebeck): Tübingen. 267-96 (1995).
(3) “Traded Services in the GATT – What’s all the Fuss About?” Intereconomics. 26:177-186 (1991).
(2) “Die evolutionsorientierte Theorie der Verfassung – Bemerkungen zum Ansatz von Hayeks.” Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik. 40:93-107 (1991).
Reprinted in English translation as: “On the Internal Consistency of Hayek’s Evolutionary oriented Constitutional Economics – Some General Remarks.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines. 3:461-476 (1993).
(1) “Defects of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.” Intereconomics. 25:147-8(1990).
Contributions to edited volumes and encyclopediae
(51) “Prosecutors: A Cross-National Perspectie” in: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Available at https://oxfordre.com/politics/ (2020).
(50) “Institutions”. Chapter 3 in: R. Kollmorgen, W. Merkel, and H.-J. Wagener (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic Transformation. Oxford University Press, 30-41 (2019).
(49) (with Jerg Gutmann) “Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy.” In: Congleton, Grofman, and Voigt (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, volume 2, 438 (2019).
(48) “Internal institutions: The major unknowns in institutional economics.” in: C. Ménard and M. Shirley (eds.): A Resseach Agenda for New Institutional Economics, Cheltenham: E. Elgar, Chapter 16, 145-152 (2018).
(47) (with Jerg Gutmann) “The Rule of Law and Islam.” in: Christopher May & Adam Winchester (eds.): The Elgar Handbook on the Rule of Law, 21, 345-356 (2018).
(46) “Constitutional Economics and the Law”; in: Francesco Parisi (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Law & Economics; Vol. I: Methodology and Concepts, 202-221 (2017).
(45) (with Matthias Dauner) “Institutionen” in: R. Kollmorgen, W. Merkel und H.-J. Wagener (Hrsg.): Handbuch Transformationsforschung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. 47-62 (2015).
(44) “Constitutional Political Economy.” in: J. Backhaus (ed.) Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, Heidelberg et al.: Springer.
(43) “Veilonomics: On the Use and Utility of Veils in Constitutional Political Economy.” in: Louis M. Imbeau & Steve Jacob (eds). Behind a Veil of Ignorance? Power and Uncertainty in Constitutional Design. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 9-33 (2015).
(42) (with Jerg Gutmann and Bernd Hayo) “Determinants of constitutionally safeguarded judicial review.” Chapter 9 (pp. 216-255) in Yun-chien Chang (ed.) Empirical Legal Analysis: Assessing the Performance of Legal Institutions. Routledge, 2013.
(41) “Constitutional design of lawmaking.” in: Francesco Parisi (ed.): Production of Legal Rules, Volume 7: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Cheltenham et al.: Elgar, pp. 3-18, 2011.
(40) “New Trends in Law & Economics: The Economic Effects of Constitutional Law”. Polish Yearbook of Law & Economics. 1:23-41 (2011).
(39) “The Economics of Informal International Lawmaking: An Empirical Assessment.” In: J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds.): Informal International Law-Making. Oxford: OUP pp. 81-105 (2012); a slightly modified version appeared in Th. Eger, S. Oeter and S. Voigt (Hrsg.): Economic Analysis of International Law, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 33-60 (2014).
(38) „A Constitution Like Any Other?“, in: Th. Eger and H.B. Schäfer (eds.): Research Handbook on the Economics of European Union Law, Cap. 1, 11-28. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2012).
(37) “Von Euckens Ordnungspolitik zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik.” in: Basedow, Jürgen und Wolfgang Wurmnest (Hrsg.) Unternehmen auf offenen Märkten – Symposium zum 70. Geburtstag von Peter Behrens, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 119-131 (2011).
(36) „Bargaining for Constitutional Change – Toward an Economic Theory of Constitutional Change“, in: M. Cano del Valle et al. (eds.): Teoría de Juegos y Derecho Contemporáneo, Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 57-83 (2009).
(35) “Die Situation der EU-Verfassung ist verfahren – Ausweg durch Verfahren?” in: M.T. Voigt et al. (eds.): Bedingungen europäischer Solidarität, Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang, 121-130 (2009).
(34) „Constitutional Political Economy – Analyzing the most basic layer of formal institutions.” in: Brousseau, E. and J.-M. Glachant (eds.): Guidebook to the New Institutional Economics, Cambridge: CUP 2008, chapter 17 (2008).
(33) “Thirty years on: Tullock, The Vote Motive, and Public Choice.” in: P. Kurrild-Klitgaard (ed.): The Vote Motive, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, pp. 117-30 (2006).
A Korean version appeared in 2009 with Kyungsung University Press.
(32) „Economic Analysis of Constitutions“ in: David S. Clark (ed.): Encyclopedia of Law and Society, 2007.
(31) (together with Lars Feld) “Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary.” in: R. Congleton and B. Swedenborg (eds.): Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy – Analysis and Evidence, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 251-88 (2006).
(30) “Judicial Independence as a Necessary Component of the Rule of Law – Preliminary Insights and Economic Consequences.” in: A. Marciano and J.-M. Josselin (eds.): Law and the State. A Political Economy Approach, Cheltenham et al.: Elgar, 242-68 (2005).
(29) “On the Coexistence of Different Property Rights Systems – and Their Consequences for Economic Growth and Development”, in: E. Colombatto (ed.): Edward Elgar Companion on Property Rights; Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 154-176 (2004).
(28) “Do We Need a New International Financial Architecture? Many Questions and Some Preliminary Policy Advice”, in: Marauhn, Th. und R. Grote (Hrsg.): On the Regulation of International Financial Markets in the Age of Liberalisation and Free Movement of Capital, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
(27) “Neue Institutionenökonomik als kulturelle Ökonomik.” in: G. Blümle, N. Goldschmidt, R. Klump, B. Schauenberg, H.v. Senger (Hrsg.): Perspektiven einer kulturellen Ökonomik, Lit-Verlag Münster, 411-26 (2004).
(26) “Versprechen glaubhaft machen – 2 neue Indikatoren zur Messung von Justizunabhängigkeit” (“Making Promises Credible – 2 New Indicators for Measuring Judicial Independence”), in: Th. Eger (Hrsg.): Institutionen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 59-84 (2003).
(25) “The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice – Towards A Comparative Analysis.” in: A.v. Aaken, Chr. List and Chr. Luetge (eds.): Deliberation and Decision, Economics, Constitutional Theory, and Deliberative Democracy, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 199-229 (2004).
(24) “The Bonds of Democratic Politics – An Economic Perspective.” in: Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe (eds.): Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics, Cambridge: CUP, 147-173 (2003).
A smilar version appeared in: Wolf Lepenies (ed.): Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals – Centers and Peripheries in a Changing World, Frankfurt: Campus, 57-84 (2003).
(23) “Do We Need a New International Financial Architecture? Many Questions and Some Preliminary Policy Advice”, in: Marauhn, Th. und R. Grote (Hrsg.): On the Regulation of International Financial Markets in the Age of Liberalisation and Free Movement of Capital, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2003.
(23) Entries “Positive Constitutional Political Economy” and „Dictators and Social Contracts” in: Rowley, Ch. and Schneider, F. (eds.): Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Kluwer 2003.
(22) “Entry „Constitutional Law”, forthcoming in: Hatzis, A. (ed.): Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2003.
(21) (together with Hella Engerer:) “Institutionen und Transformation – Mögliche Politikimplikationen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik.”, in: K. Zimmermann (Hrsg.): Neue Entwicklungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Heidelberg et al.: Physica, 149-215 (2001).
An English Version appeared under the title “Institutions and Transition – Possible Policy Implications of the New Institutional Economics” in: K. Zimmermann (ed.); Frontiers in Economics, Heidelberg et al.: Springer, pp. 127-84 (2002).
Chinesische Übersetzung 2005.
(20) “Konstitutionellen Wandel erklären – zur Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft als Determinante der Verfassungswirklichkeit.” (“Explaining Constitutional Change – the Role of Civil Society as a determinant of constitutional Reality”), in: J. Nautz (ed.); Das Rechtssystem zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft – Zur Rolle gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung und vorstaatlicher Schlichtung, Passagen Verlag, Wien 67-79 (2001).
A slightly modified version to appear in Bulgarian in: Ivan Krastev (ed.); Footnotes – Social Sciences and the Other Century, Sofia 181-204 (2001).
(19) “Das Konzept der nationalstaatlichen Souveränität und die Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik.” (“The Concept of Nation-State Sovereignty and the Theory of Economic Policy”) to appear in: H. Berg (ed.); Neuere Entwicklungen in der Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Band 278, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 55-78 (2001).
(18) “What Constitution for Europe? The Constitutional Question from the Point of View of (Positive) Constitutional Economics.”, to appear in: Th. Bruha (Hrsg.): What Constitution for Europe? Baden-Baden: Nomos, 41-61 (2002).
(17) “Das Verhältnis von Staat und Gesellschaft bei Friedrich A. von Hayek – ein Vorschlag zur Weiterentwicklung” (“The relationship between state and society in Hayek – a proposal for further development”), in: H. Leipold und I. Pies (Hrsg.): Zur Konzeption von Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik: Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungsperspektiven, Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius, 125-144 (2000).
(16) Entry “Ordnungsökonomik” („Economics of Order“) in Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon (15th edition), Wiesbaden 2000.
(15) Entry “Wirtschaftsforschung” (“Economic Research”) in Evangelisches Soziallexikon, Stuttgart 2000.
(14) “Marktwirtschaftlicher Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren” (“Market Competition as a Discovery Procedure”), in: G. Papke (Hrsg.): Wissen, Freiheit und Ordnung – Friedrich August von Hayek, Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, erscheint Anfang 2000 (translations into English and Chinese being prepared).
(13) “Wirtschaftliche Freiheitsrechte, Ressourcenverteilung und Wirtschaftswachstum: Zum heuristischen Potential des Vergleichs von Wirtschaftssystemen” (“Economic Freedom, Resource Endowment and Economic Growth: on the Heuristic Potential of Comparing Economic Systems”), in: Dieter Cassel (ed.): Perspektiven der Systemforschung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 271-97 (1999).
(12) Entry “Transformation in Osteuropa” (“Transition in Central and Eastern Europe”) in: Herrmann-Pillath, C. and M. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (eds.): Handbuch Evolutorische Ökonomik, vol. 2: Evolutorische Ökonomik in der Anwendung, Berlin et al.: Springer.
(11) Entry “Constitutional Law” in Boudewijn Bouckaert und Gerrit de Geest Eds.): Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, Cheltenham: Elgar, 529-42 (2000).
(10) (together with Daniel Kiwit): “The Role and Evolution of Beliefs, Habits, Moral Norms, and Institutions”, in: Herbert Giersch (Ed.): The Merits of Markets – Critical Issues of the Open Society, Berlin et al.: Springer, 83-108 (1998).
(9) “Das Forschungsprogramm der Positiven Konstitutionenökonomik” (“The Research Program of Positive Constitutional Economics”) in: Gerd Grözinger and Stephan Panther (eds.): Unsere Konstitution in guter Form und Verfassung? Marburg: Metropolis; 279-319 (1998).
(8) “Kants Gerechtigkeitskriterien, die Wirtschaftstheorie und die ökonomischen Transformationsprozesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa” (“Kant’s Criteria of Justice, Economic Theory, and the Transition Processes of Central and Eastern European Economies”), in: K. Dicke/K.-M. Kodalle (Eds.): Republik und Weltbürgerrecht, Weimar/Köln: Böhlau, 399-434 (1998).
(7) Entry “Spontane Ordnung” (“Spontaneous Order”) in: Gabler Volkswirtschaftslexikon, Band 2, Wiesbaden: Gabler 998-1000 (1996).
slightly abridged version in: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, Band 4, Wiesbaden: Gabler (14. Auflage), 3524f. (1996)
(6) Entry “Konstitutionenökonomik” (“Constitutional Economics”) in: Gabler Volkswirtschaftslexikon, Band 1, Wiesbaden: Gabler, 621-9 (1996).
slightly abridged version in: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, Band 2, Wiesbaden: Gabler (14. Auflage), 2213-18 (1996).
(5) “Die konstitutionelle Ökonomik als Herausforderung für die Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik – zugleich eine Skizze zur Weiterentwicklung einer ökonomischen Theorie der Verfassung” (“Constitutional Economics as a Challenge to the Theory of Economic Policy – Also a Sketch of How to Develop an Economic Theory of Constitutions”), in: Ingo Pies und Martin Leschke (Eds.): James Buchanans konstitutionelle Ökonomik, Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr (Siebeck), 157-83 (1996).
(4) “Der Weg zur Freiheit – Mögliche Implikationen Hayekscher Hypothesen für die Transformation der Wirtschaftssysteme Mittel- und Osteuropas” (“The Road to Freedom – Possible Implications of Hayekian Hypotheses for the Transition of Central and Eastern Europe’s Economic Systems”), in: Hölscher, J.; A. Jacobsen, H. Tomann, H. Weisfeld (Eds.): Bedingungen ökonomischer Entwicklung in Zentralosteuropa, Vol.2: Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Systemwandel, Marburg: Metropolis, 63-105 (1994).
(3) (together with M.E. Streit:) “The Economics of Conflict Resolution in International Trade”, in: D. Friedmann und E.J. Mestmäcker (Eds.); Conflict Resolution in International Trade, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 39-77 (1993).
reprinted in German as “Die Ökonomik der Konfliktlösung im internationalen Handel” in Manfred E. Streit: Freiburger Beiträge zur Ordnungsökonomik, Mohr (Siebeck): Tübingen, 225-63 (1995).
(2) “Wirtschaftspolitischer Handlungsbedarf auf internationaler Ebene als Reaktion auf strategische Allianzen” (“Policy Implications on the International level as a Reaction to Strategic Alliances”), in: G. Prosi und Ch. Watrin (Eds.); Dynamik des Weltmarktes – Schlankheitskur für den Staat? Veröffentlichungen der Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung, Band 37, Köln: Bachem, 141-7 (1993).
(1) “Strategische Allianzen – ein Kartell der Konzerne gegen die Konsumenten dieser Welt? Zur Frage, ob grenzüberschreitende Unternehmenskooperationen wettbewerbspolitischen Handlungsbedarf auslösen” (“Strategic Alliances – Triggering the Necessity of International Antitrust Policy?”), in: Hanns Martin Schleyer Stiftung (Ed.); Dynamik des Weltmarktes – Schlankheitskur für den Staat? – Forschungsergebnisse im Überblick, Köln, 226-227 (1992).
Discusssion Papers (mostly under review):
(18) (with Engy Amin, Mazan Hassan, and Sarah Mansour): Examining Different Discourses to Incentivize Cooperation in Arab-Muslim Culture: Experimental Evidence from Egypt; Mimeo: University of Cairo and University of Hamburg.
(17) (with Nora El Bialy, Elisa Fraile, Lamis Saleh, and Andreas Nicklisch): Lying and Learning Among Syrian Refugees, Mimeo, Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg
(16) (with Nora El Bialy, Elisa Fraile, Lamis Saleh, and Andreas Nicklisch): No Man is an Island – Trust, Trustworthiness, and Social Capital among Syrian Refugees in Germany; mimeo Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg
(15) (with Nora El Bialy, Elisa Fraile, Lamis Saleh, and Andreas Nicklisch): Syrian Civil War Victims Trust Each Other, but Punish When and Whomever they can
(14) (with Nora El Bialy, Elisa Fraile, Lamis Saleh, and Andreas Nicklisch): A Sense of No Future in an Uncertain Present: Altruism and Risk-Seeking among Syrian Refugees in Jordan
(13) Contracting for Catastrophe: Legitmizing Emergency Constitutions by Drawing on Social Contract Theory. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3288664.
(12) (with Christian BjØrnskov and Mahdi Khesali) Unlawful States of Emergency
(11) (with Christian BjØrnskov) This Time is Different? On the Use of Emergency Measures During the Corona Pandemic
(10) (with Nora El Bialy and Andreas Nicklisch) Risk-Taking, Trust, and Traumatization Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan – A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3054467.
(9) (with Jerg Gutmann) The Heterogeneous Effects of Natural Disasters on Human Rights. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049032.
(8) (with Jerg Gutmann) Why Adopt a Federal Constitution? And why Decentralize? – Determinants Based on a New Dataset; available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962625.
(7) (with Christian BjØrnskov) The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions; available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697144.
(6) Bjørnskov, C., & Voigt, S. More Power to Government= More People Killed?–on Some Unexpected Effects of Constitutional Emergency Provisions During Natural Disasters.
(5) (with Jerg Gutmann and Katharina Pfaff) The Effects of Financial Crises on Political Institutions; available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2624253.
(4) (with Lorenz Blume and Bernd Hayo) “Correlates and Determinants of Direct Democracy”; available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2542156.
(3) (with Patrick Brown and Jerg Gutmann) “Let the Sunshine in: Why Countries Adopt Freedom of Information Acts. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405415.
(2) (with Jerg Gutmann) “Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand. Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2392780.
(1) “The Interplay Between National and International Law – Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators.”
Miscellaneous:
(34) “Direkte Demokratie: Ausprägungen, Wirkungen, Gründe – ein Überblick zum Stand der Forschung”. in: G. Benn-Ibler und P. Lewisch (eds.): Direkte Demokratie – Chancen und Risiken, Wien: Manz, 13-29.
(33) “Innovate–Don’t Imitate!-ENCJ Research Should Focus on Research Gaps”. International Journal for Court Administration, 9(3) (2018).
(32) “Notstandsverfassungen – Wer hat sie, wer nutzt sie und wem nützen sie?”; Kriminalwissenschaften in Theorie und Praxis, Frankfurt: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft (2017).
(31) (mit Lars Feld und Jerg Gutmann) “Mehr Wirtschaftswachstum durch eine unabhängige Justiz?” Justice – Justiz – Giustizia 2015/3 (2015).
(30) (with Anna Kane) “Das European Doctorate in Law and Economics”; Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 3:671-673 (2015).
(29) “Spielräume des EuGH – eine ökonomische Analyse”; Kommentar zu Christian Hillgruber und Carl Otto Lenz, in: P. Behrens, T. Eger und H.-B. Schäfer (Hrsg.): Ökonomische Analyse des Europarechts. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 37-44 (2012).
(28) “The Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, Comment Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 167(1):165-167 (2011).
(27) “When are judges likely to be corrupt?” in: Transparency International – Global Corruption Report 2007, Cambridge: CUP.
(26) “Economic Growth, certainty in the law and judicial independence”, in: Transparency International – Global Corruption Report 2007, Cambridge: CUP.
(25) (together with Lorenz Blume): Case Study on Germany for an OECD Project on Contracts between Levels of Government (GOV/TDPC 18 (2006).
(24) Module “Neue Institutionenökonomik“ und “Economic Effects of Judicial Systems” für Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance, Berlin und Frankfurt (Oder), 2006.
(23) Comment on “Judicial Reforms in Developing Countries” by M. Stephenson and “Transforming Judicial Systems” by J. and Ch. Gray, in: Pleskovic, B. (Hrsg.): Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington: The World Bank, 367-373 (2007).
(22) Korreferat zu Massimo Bordignon “Aspects of EU Organization” erscheint in: Berger/Moutos (Hrsg.):Designing the New European Union, Cambridge: MIT Press 2007.
(21) Korreferat zu “Besonderheiten der Sozialwirtschaft – Grenzen des Wettbewerbs?” erscheint in: Aufderheide, D. und Ch. Dabrowski (Hrsg.): Markt und Wettbewerb in der Sozialwirtschaft, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007.
(20) “Was, wenn trotz Revision nur ein déjà vu bleibt?“ Kommentar zum Beitrag von Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, in: Th. Eger (Hrsg.): Voraussetzungen für grundlegende institutionelle Reformen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 189-91 (2006).
(19) (together with Lars Feld): “How Does Judicial Independence Affect the Investment Climate?” In: Kochendörfer-Lucius and B. Pleskovic (eds.): Investment Climate, Growth, and Poverty, Washington: The World Bank; pp. 53-61 (2005).
(18) Review of Market-Augmenting Government – The Institutional Foundations for Prosperity, Edited by Omar Azfar & Charles A. Cadwell, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, The Journal of Economic Literature, XLII(4):1138f. (2004).
(17) Review of Patricia Dillon and Frank C. Wykoff (2002); “Creating Capitalism – Transitions and Growth in Post-Soviet Europe”, Cheltenham et al.: Edward Elgar, in: The Economic Journal, electronic version 2003.
(16) “Der Vorhang zu und alle Fragen offen? – Einige Fragen zu Regelbindung und Unabhängigkeit in der Wirtschaftspolitik”; Korreferat zu Andreas Freytag: Die ordnende Potenz des Staates: Prinzipien für eine Wettbewerbs- und Währungsordnung, in: Pies, I. und Leschke, M. (Hrsg.): Walter Euckens Ordungspolitik, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2002.
(15) Verfassungswandel ökonomisch erklären: Fragen und Einsichten eines neuen und interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms, Colloquia Academica – Akademievorträge junger Wissenschaftler, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001.
(14) The Interdependence Between Private and Constitutional Law: a Comment on the Grady & McGuire Paper, Journal of Bioeconomics 1(3):263-68.
(13) Comment on Jörn Sideras (“Systems Competition needs rules – But what exactly should they look like?”) Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 19:188-90 (2000).
(12) Comment on Ekatarina Zhuravskaya (“Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style”) in: J.-J. Dethier (ed.): Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 171-76 (2000).
(11) Review of Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman (eds.): Economics, Values, and Organization, Cambridge University Press 1998, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(2):358-60 (1999).
(10) Review of James M. Buchanan, Post-Socialist Political Economy – Selected Essays, Edward Elgar 1997, Constitutional Political Economy 10:111-3 (1999).
(9) Review of Branko Milanovíc; Income, inequality, and poverty during the transition from planned to market economy, The World Bank 1998, European Journal of Political Economy 14:801-2 (1998).
(8) Comment on Ulrich Druwe (“Die Umsetzung ordnungsethischer Erkenntnisse in der Politik”): “Optimismus allein genügt nicht – die Umsetzung ordnungstheoretischer Erkenntnisse setzt deren Existenz voraus”, in: D. Aufderheide und M. Dabrowski (eds.); Wirtschaftsethik und Moralökonomik: Normen, soziale Ordnung und der Beitrag der Ökonomik, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 311-15 (1997).
(7) Review of Avinash K. Dixit; The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective, The MIT Press 1996 (Munich Lectures in Economics; Center for Economic Studies), European Journal of Political Economy, 13:389-92 (1996).
(6) Comment on Keith Cowling und Roger Sugden (“Beyond Capitalism and State Socialism”), in: Hölscher, J., A. Jacobsen, H. Tomann, H. Weisfeld (Eds.): Bedingungen ökonomischer Entwicklung in Zentralosteuropa, Vol.5: Marburg: Metropolis, 173-178 (1996).
(5) Review of Blommestein, Hendrikus J. and Bernard Steunenberg (Ed.): Government and Markets – Establishing a Democratic Constitutional Order and a Market Economy in Former Socialist Countries, Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994, European Journal of Political Economy, 12:165-8 (1996).
(4) Review of Lothar Elsner; Wirtschaftliche Ungerechtigkeit als Anfrage an Markttheorie und methodistische Wirtschaftsethik, Theologie für die Praxis, 21:47-50 (1995).
(3) Review of Ingo Pies; Normative Institutionenökonomik, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,151:412-415 (1994).
reprinted in Spanish translation in Dialogo Cientifico, 5:83-6 (1996).
(2) Review of Adam Przeworski; Democracy and the market, Constitutional Political Economy, 4:295-298 (1993).
(1) Review of Dieter Helm (Ed.); The Economic Borders of the State, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 209:562-564 (1992).
